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Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of
the 1990 Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act
Ralph W. Johnson* and Sharon I. Haensly**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 1990, Congress passed the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA").' NAGPRA provides
for the protection and disposition of Native American cultural items
discovered on federal 2 or tribal' lands after NAGPRA's effective date.
NAGPRA also addresses disposition of those objects currently held or
4
controlled by federal agencies and museums.
NAGPRA represents Congress' attempt to resolve years of debate
between tribes, archaeologists, and museums. 5 Like any legislative pronouncement, however, Congress left key issues to agencies and courts
to resolve. This article focuses upon one such area, namely, Fifth

* Professor, School of Law, University of Washington; J.D. 1949, School of Law, University of Oregon; B.S. 1947, University of Oregon. Professor Johnson has taught Federal
American Indian Law since 1969 and also specializes in water law. He has served as a consultant
to the United States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and to the states of Washington
and Alaska regarding Indian law.
**
Attorney, EPA Office of Regional Counsel, Seattle, Washington; J.D. 1988, University
of Oregon School of Law; B.S. 1981, Cornell University. Ms. Haensly is the lead EPA regional
attorney for Native American issues. This article was written in her private capacity, and no
official support or endorsement by the EPA or any other agency of the Federal Government is
intended or should be inferred.
1. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 (West Supp. 1991) (reprinted in appendix).
2. Id. § 3001(5). "Federal lands" include lands other than tribal lands controlled or owned
by the United States, including lands selected by, but not yet conveyed to, Alaska Native
corporations and groups organized pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
Id.
3. See id. § 3002. "Tribal lands" include all land within the exterior boundary of any
Indian reservation; all dependent Indian communities; and all lands administered for the benefit
of Native Hawaiians pursuant to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. Id. § 3001(15).
4. See id. § 3005(a).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4367, 4368-70.
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Amendment 6 takings questions that may arise when tribes or individual
Native Americans demand the return of cultural items from persons
discovering them on lands owned in unrestricted fee simple on Indian
reservations .7
The first section of the article describes the statutory scheme. The
second section delineates the different classes of cultural items and legal
principles pertaining to ownership. The third section explores issues
related to Fifth Amendment takings. The article concludes with recommendations for both the Department of Interior to consider in forthcoming rulemaking and for Congress to consider in future legislative
pronouncements affecting the return of Native American cultural items.
II.

SUMMARY OF STATUTE

The universe of "cultural items" covered by NAGPRA includes
human remains, associated and unassociated funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.' NAGPRA establishes two
markedly dissimilar schemes governing the return of Native American
cultural items to tribes or individual Native Americans. The analysis
depends upon whether the item is currently held by a museum or federal
agency 9 or is inadvertently discovered on federal or tribal lands after
the effective date of the Act. 10 Each category of objects has unique
legal implications regarding ownership, which are briefly discussed in
Section Three of this article.
All museums and feieral agencies that possess or control collections
of human remains and\associated funerary objects must prepare inventories identifying the items' geographical and cultural affiliations."
These agencies and museums must also prepare less detailed summaries
of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony. 2 Native American individuals and tribes will use the inventories and summaries to ascertain whether they are culturally affiliated
to the object, decide whether they desire its return, and, depending
upon the object's classification, either demand the object outright or
first present prima facie evidence that the agency or museum lacks a

6. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
7. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
8. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(3).
9. See id. §§ 3003-3007.
10. See id. § 3002(a).
11. Id. § 3004(a).
12. Id. § 3005.
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"right of possession.' ' 3 Museums and federal agencies retain a right
of possession only by showing that the original Native American
individual or group with authority to alienate the object did so vol4
untarily.
Rarely will Fifth Amendment takings claims arise when Native American individuals or tribes request that museums return objects. Congress
anticipated such challenges and provided that parties must turn to
"otherwise applicable property law" if applying the concept of "right
of possession" implicates a Fifth Amendment takings claim (as determined by the Court of Claims). 5 This escape valve does not apply
when a Native American individual or tribe requests the return of
human remains or associated funerary objects inadvertently discovered
on federal or tribal lands.
The statutory scheme differs dramatically for objects inadvertently
discovered on federal or tribal lands. NAGPRA broadly defines tribal
lands to encompass all lands within the external boundaries of the
reservation. 16 Due in large part to nineteenth century federal allotment
acts, Indian reservations often include lands owned by non-Indians in
unrestricted fee simple, in addition to lands held in federal trust or
restricted status for tribes and members, federal public lands, and state
and county lands. 7 On-reservation lands owned in unrestricted fee
simple, also referred to in this article as "reservation fee lands," are
often the subject of jurisdictional disputes between landowners, tribes,
and state or local governments asserting regulatory jurisdiction.'
13. Id. § 3006(a)-(c). Native American individuals and tribes with cultural affiliations to
human remains and associated funerary objects need not present prima facie evidence when
requesting return of the objects. See id. § 3006(a).
14. Id. § 3001(13).
15. Id; see H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 5, at 25-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4384-87 (letter from Bruce Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, warning the Committee
of Takings Clause implications).
16. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(15).
17. See FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 129-38 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN]. Many of the allotment acts divided reservations into allotments
for individual Indians and sold much of the undivided land as "surplus land" to non-Indians.
Id. at 131. Indians often sold their lands once alienation restrictions on their allotments lapsed.
Although the Federal Government reversed its allotment policy in 1934, the allotment process
drastically reduced Indian land holdings. Id. at 136-38. Tribal and individual land holdings fell
from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in 1934. Id. at 138; see also Craighton
Goeppele, Comment, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation Environment
After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 65 WASH. L. REV.
417, 418 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (dispute over whether county or tribal zoning authority applied to non-Indian reservation
fee lands); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (dispute over whether state or tribal
regulations applied to non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian reservation fee lands).
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Someone inadvertently discovering a cultural item on federal or tribal
land must cease all activity in the area of discovery, notify, in writing,
the federal land manager and appropriate Indian tribe, obtain certification that notification was received, and take all reasonable steps to
protect the item. 19 The person may resume activity thirty days after
receiving federal or tribal certification."
NAGPRA establishes a priority system for ownership or control of
cultural items excavated or removed from federal or tribal lands. Lineal
descendants of those whose remains were found have first priority. 2' If
no lineal descendants come forward, or in the case of unassociated
funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony,
priority begins with the tribe on whose land the objects were discovered. 22 Next in priority is the tribe with the closest cultural affiliation
to the objects, and last in priority is the tribe recognized by the Indian
Claims Commission or Court of Claims as having aboriginally occupied
the area.23 The Secretary of the Interior will promulgate regulations
governing disposal of cultural items not claimed through the priority
system. 24
A party desiring to excavate cultural items from tribal lands must
obtain a permit pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection
Act ("ARPA") as well as tribal permission. 25 ARPA's jurisdiction,
however, extends only to Indian lands held in trust or subject to a
restriction on alienation; 26 whereas NAGPRA's jurisdiction extends to
all lands within exterior reservation boundaries. 27 Additionally, ARPA's
definition of "archaeological resources" 28 and NAGPRA's definition
of "cultural items" are far from identical. 29 NAGPRA permits the
intentional removal of cultural items from federal or tribal lands only

19. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3002(d)(1).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3002(a)(1).
22. Id. § 3002(a)(2). NAGPRA does not address priority if more than one tribe occupies the
same reservation. See id. § 3002(a)(2)(A).
23. Id. § 3002(b), (c). A tribe having aboriginally occupied the area could only claim the
item if cultural affiliation is not otherwise ascertained and the objects were discovered on federal
land recognized as aboriginal by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or Court of
Claims. A tribe other than the one aboriginally occupying the area may also have a claim
contingent upon its demonstrating a stronger relationship to the item. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(C).
24. Id. § 3002(b).
25. Id. § 3002(c)(1); see also Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aamm (1988 & West Supp. 1991).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4).
27. See supra text accompanying note 3.
28.

16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l).

29.

25 U.S.C.A § 3001(3).
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with an ARPA permit "which shall be consistent with this Act," 30 but
fails to expressly amend ARPA's coverage of items and lands. 3'
Fifth Amendment takings claims will probably not arise when parties
inadvertently discover cultural items on federal lands. ARPA firmly
established that archaeological resources found on federal lands belong

to the Federal Government.3 2 NAGPRA would not divest a private
party of a property right, but merely effects a change in ownership
from the Government to an individual Native American or tribe.
NAGPRA delineates an elaborate repatriation process for objects
held by museums and federal agencies, and expressly avoids most Fifth

Amendment takings challenges.33 In contrast are the sparse provisions
governing disposition and control of cultural items discovered on federal

or tribal lands.34 NAGPRA contains no similarly detailed process for
the individual Native American or tribe to determine cultural affiliation
or assert ownership, establishes no applicable burden of proof, and
provides no forum for a landowner or finder to object to the disposition
of cultural items. The legislative history evidences that Congress barely
considered issues associated with the excavation, control, and disposition
of objects inadvertently discovered on reservation fee lands.35
III.

TYPES OF OBJECTS

By common law, ownership of objects located below the land surface
vests in the landowner.3 6 However, human remains and, arguably,

30. Id. § 3002(c)(1).
31. NAGPRA does not explicitly amend ARPA. The United States Army Corps of Engineers
recommended framing the proposed protections to burial sites as amendments to ARPA to avoid
"duplication of law and confusion to program managers." H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 5, at
24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4383.
Congress may have amended ARPA by implication when it enacted NAGPRA. Courts allow,
but do not favor, such amendments, and will not uphold them in doubtful cases or if constitutional
issues are raised. IA C. DALLAS SANDS & NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.13 (4th ed. 1985). Courts, however, may permit implied amendments if terms of the
later law are so inconsistent with those of the prior law that they cannot be read together. Id.
Definitions of covered items and tribal lands contained in ARPA and NAGPRA are inconsistent.
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(3).
33. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001(13), 3005.
34. See id. § 3002.
35. The only testimony during the debate that directly pertained to items found on or
excavated from fee lands was provided by the American Association of Museums, which asserted
that state property law likely controlled ownership of such objects. Native American Grave and
Burial Protection Act and Native American Repatriation of Cultural Patrimony Act: Hearings on
S. 1021 and S. 1980 Before the Select Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
97 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
36. See Margaret B. Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains: Approaches
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associated funerary remains are treated differently. Human remains are

considered "quasi-property." 37 Certain survivors are trustees of and
have a property interest in the remains, no matter where the remains
are found, but only for the limited purpose of conducting a proper

funeral.38 A trustee may find it increasingly difficult to prove even a

quasi-property right as the remains decompose.3 9
NAGPRA defines "associated funerary objects" as objects placed
with human remains at the time of death or later as part of a ceremony,

as well as objects containing human remains/h "Unassociated funerary
objects" include objects reasonably believed to have been placed with

human remains at the time of death or later, but which somehow
became separated from the human remains.' Parties must demonstrate,
by a preponderance of evidence, that unassociated funerary items are
related to specific individuals, families, or known human remains, or
were removed from a burial site of an individual culturally affiliated
to the tribe. 42 NAGPRA's definitions of associated and unassociated
funerary objects curiously refer to possession by federal agencies or
museums, even though funerary objects may also be discovered or
43
excavated on federal or tribal lands.
Ownership of associated and unassociated funerary remains usually
does not vest in the owner of the land under which they were discov-

ered. 44 Funerary objects, like dead bodies, are the rightful property of
the person who furnished the graves or the descendants, for the limited
purpose of reinterment. 41 Consequently, landowners discovering human

to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 167 (1989); Thomas H. Boyd,
Disputes Regarding the Possession of Native American Religious and Cultural Objects and Human
Remains: A Discussion of the Applicable Law and Proposed Legislation, 55 Mo. L. REV. 883,
893 (1990); Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing
Competing Legal Interests in Native CulturalResources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437,
445 (1986).
37. See HUGH Y. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD 16-17 (2d ed.
1979); R.F. Martin, Annotation, Corpse Removal and Reinterment, 21 A.L.R.2d 472, 485-86
(1950).
38. See BERNARD, supra note 37, at 19-20; Bowman, supra note 36, at 167; Boyd, supra
note 36, at 888-89.
39. Martin, supra note 37, at 476 (a cadaver ceases to be a dead body under some state laws
after undergoing a certain degree of decomposition).
40. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(3)(a).
41. See id.§ 3001(3)(b).
42. Id.
43. See id.§ 3001(3)(a), (b).
44. See Boyd, supra note 36, at 890 n.33.
45. See id.at 890; see also Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(disagreeing that ownership of objects buried on non-reservation land with the deceased transferred
to the discovering party, but rather finding that the tribe was the lawful owner); Senate Hearing,
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remains and associated and unassociated funerary remains on their
property probably cannot raise successful takings challenges because
they lack an ownership interest.
There is more disagreement concerning ownership of sacred objects,
which NAGPRA defines as ceremonial objects used by traditional
Native American leaders for the practice of traditional Native American

religions by their present-day adherents.

6

Although these objects are

extremely important to Native American individuals and tribes,47 parties

disagree over whether they are subject to the same common-law principles that apply to human remains and funerary objects."
Congress was concerned during the debate that the definition of

sacred objects not be overly broad. 49 The House Committee recognized

the importance of "present day adherents" to traditional Native American religions, but also acknowledged that objects could reach "sacred"
levels if needed to renew traditional ceremonies that were "interrupted
because of governmental coercion, adverse -societal conditions or the

loss of certain objects through means beyond the control of the tribe
at that time." 50 The Senate Committee intended that the definition of
sacred objects exclude items created for purely secular purposes.,, The
legislative history also indicates Congress' willingness to defer to Native
American interpretation of those items intrinsically necessary for relig2
ious practices.1
Although Native Americans and tribes may be unable to assert the
same common-law property rights to sacred objects as to human remains

supra note 35, at 95-96 (statement of the American Association of Museums), 195-96 (testimony
of Native American Rights Fund attorney Walter Echo-Hawk).
46. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(3)(C).
47. See Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 181-82, 191-93. See generally Bowen Blair, American
Indians vs. American Museums: A Matter of Religious Freedom, AM. INDL4N J., May 1979, at
13, 13.
48. See Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 96-97 (statement of American Association of
Museums that religious and cultural objects are more likely to be viewed as items in which private
parties hold personal property interests). But see id. at 195-96 (statement of Walter Echo-Hawk
urging the Committee to consider religious and cultural objects as inalienable property belonging
to Native American groups).
49. For example, the Department of Interior ("DOI") stated that the concepts of sacred
objects and cultural patrimony were "too broad and unformulated" to include in the legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 5, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4391. DOI urged
postponement of such legislation until tribal and national preservation programs resolved issues
of ownership, control, and possession of sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony.
50. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4373.
51. S. REP. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).
52. See 136 CONG. REC. H10990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). The final version rejected an art
dealer association's suggestion that sacred objects be "irreplaceable" because "courts should not
determine what is intrinsically necessary for the practice of a religion." Id.
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and funerary objects, they may look to equitable theories to support

ownership. Sacred objects implicate First Amendment rights relating to
free exercise of religion. 3 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
("AIRFA"), 4 while probably creating no substantive or judiciallyenforceable rights," contains the Federal Government's express promise
to protect and preserve American Indians' rights to exercise traditional
religions through the "use and possession of sacred objects. ' 5 6 Courts

weighing property interests in sacred objects should also consider the
objects' imbortance to Native American culture and religion. 7 And
courts may also consider the objects inalienable, like cultural patrimony,
because they will often be essential to, and collectively claimed by, the
tribe.8
The last category of items covered by NAGPRA, cultural patrimony,
includes objects with ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture.5 9 These objects
are by definition inalienable by individual Native Americans.6 Like
sacred objects, the legislative history evidences Congress' desire to avoid
61
an overly broad definition of cultural patrimony.

Parties asserting ownership interests in buried cultural patrimony
must overcome certain legal hurdles. Museums and federal agencies will
have difficulty proving the "right of possession," or the validity of the

original transfer. 62 The concept of communal ownership may similarly
disadvantage landowners and finders of cultural items on tribal lands,

53. See Boyd, supra note 36, at 890.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
55. Federal agencies have not promulgated regulations pursuant to AIRFA, and courts have
held that NAGPRA does not grant Native Americans any substantive rights additional to those
granted through the First Amendment. See Bowman, supra note 36, at 189-92.
56. AIRFA states in full:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1996.
57. Sacred objects have a unique relationship to native American culture and religion. See
Blair, supra note 47, at 15; Boyd, supra note 36, at 891.
58. See Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 195-96 (statement of Walter Echo-Hawk); Boyd,
supra note 36, at 890.
59. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(2)(3)(D).
60. Id.
61. See S. REP. No. 473, supra note 51, at 7-8. The Committee intended that the term refer
to only those items with "such great importance" to the tribe as to be inalienable by an individual.
Cultural patrimony would include objects such as Zuni War Gods and Iroquois Wampum belts.
Id.

62. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(2)(13).
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but the analysis is less straightforward. Rather than focus on the validity
of the original conveyance, Native Americans can stress their collective
property interest in cultural patrimony. 63 These items are arguably not
64
ordinary personal property subject to ordinary common law principles.
Courts may equitably consider the cultural item's significance to Native
65

American heritage.

Factors other than the object's classification may also affect ownership. By common law, a finder who takes possession of lost or
abandoned property and exercises dominion and control acquires title,

regardless of who owns the land. 6 The landowner, however, usually
has rightful possession over items found embedded in the soil.6 7 Neither
landowner, nor finder, have title to an object that the true owner never
abandoned." Property is abandoned if the owner voluntarily and intentionally relinquishes all right, title, claim, and possession without
vesting them in another person. 69

In the case of Charrier v. Bell,70 the Louisiana Court of Appeals
denied an amateur archaeologist's claim to artifacts found buried on
non-reservation private land because the Tunica Indians had never

intended to abandon them. 71 The court found that the Tunicas intended

the items to remain perpetually buried to serve spiritual or traditional
purposes.72

IV.

TAKINGS ISSUES
Having examined NAGPRA's statutory framework and covered items,
the remainder of the article discusses issues that could be raised in the

63. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural
Property Protection in England, 78 CAL. L. Rv. 1543 (1990). Professor Sax explores the origins
of English cultural property law and suggests that such objects have two distinct elements: the
proprietor's compensable interest in the item's use or value, and society's collective historical
interest. Id. at 1554-56.
64. See id.at 1554, 1557.
65. See Boyd, supra note 36, at 891-92. Mr. Boyd refers to the financial worth of cultural
items, and suggests that tribes could generate revenue by displaying these objects in tribal museums.
Id. at 892 n.41.
66. See Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 568 F. Supp. 1562,
1565 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (landowner must both know of the item's existence on his property, and
intend to exercise dominion and control over it); RAYMOND A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY 23-32 (2d ed. 1955).
67. See Klein, 568 F. Supp. at 1565-66 (allowing the United States to maintain title to an
abandoned ship found embedded in submerged lands owned by the Federal Government).
68. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Brown, supra note 66, at 23.
69. See Boyd, supra note 36, at 919-20.
70. 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
71. Id. at 604-05.
72. Id. at 605.
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context of a takings claim. For example, a non-Native American holding
fee title to land within an Indian reservation begins logging a portion
of his property. He uncovers several burial mounds with human bones
and other objects that appear quite old. The landowner, who recently
learned through a reservation-wide mailing of new federal legislation
affecting Native American artifacts, informs the tribe's cultural resources director of his find.
The landowner soon receives a letter from the director stating that,
pursuant to recent federal law, the tribe certifies its receipt of his
notification and directs him to immediately cease all activity in the area
of the discovery and take steps to protect the items.73 He can resume
his activity within thirty days of receiving the tribe's letter, and the
tribe will inform him during the thirty days of the following: 1) whether
the objects are cultural items under NAGPRA; 2) whether the tribe,
another tribe, or a Native American individual culturally affiliated with
the object will dictate the item's ownership and control; and 3) how
the items will ultimately be handled-the landowner may be asked to
leave them in place with appropriate protections or excavate them
74
pursuant to a permit and relinquish possession.
The landowner is concerned with the tribe's response. Not only does
he wish to retain and ultimately sell some of the objects, he is worried
that the tribe will prescribe stringent protection mechanisms for leaving
them in place, which in turn may severely curtail his logging and future
activities. The landowner contacts an attorney.
A.

Applicable Law

1. Federal Law
The primary source of law covering the landowner's activities on the
reservation is NAGPRA. The initial issue is whether NAGPRA represents a valid exercise of Congress' plenary power to legislate Native
American affairs, including the potential effect on non-Indians and

73. The statute does not describe when or how a tribe or Native American individual would
determine whether the object is a cultural item before requesting that the activity cease. See Senate
Hearing, supra note 35, at 581-82 (statement of Gary S. Small, The Salt River Project).
74. NAGPRA does not address the permitting process for excavating objects from non-trust
lands within reservations and, more specifically, who will obtain the permit. NAGPRA requires
landowners to obtain tribal consent before excavating, 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001(3)(c), but does not
address whether a tribe or Native American can require the landowner to excavate the object.
Nor does NAGPRA address the appropriate permitting mechanism on reservation fee lands in
light of ARPA's jurisdictional constraints. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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reservation fee lands. Courts have long upheld Congress' plenary power
to legislate on behalf of Native Americans and tribes. 7 This power is
constitutionally-based and extremely broad in scope. 76 Congress may
afford Native Americans and tribes special treatment, as long as such
treatment is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress'

unique

obligation towards Indians.7 7 Congress may also enact legislation that
applies to Indian country and, like NAGPRA, significantly departs
from state laws. 78
Congress, by enacting NAGPRA, exercised its plenary power to
legislate about the handling, ownership, and disposition of Native
American cultural items. Although NAGPRA contains no statements
of purpose, its legislative history is replete with Congress' acknowledg-

ment of the nedd for a repatriation process to redress past wrongs and
to adequately protect cultural items found in the future. 79 NAGPRA
"reflects the unique relationship" between the Federal Government and
tribes .80

Congress can enact legislation for Native Americans that reaches nonIndians and reservation fee land.8' Courts have similarly upheld Congress' delegation to tribes of federal authority over non-Indians and
reservation fee land, particularly where the regulated subject matter
affects the internal and social relations of tribal life.8 2 NAGPRA

75. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs' Indian employment preference); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378
(1886) (upholding constitutionality of federal Major Crimes Act).
76. See generally COHEN, supra note 17, at 207-12.
77.
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391 (1976) ("[Dlisparate treatment of the Indian
is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the
congressional policy of Indian self-government."); Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 ("The Indian
employment preference is not a racial, but a political preference . . . designed to further the cause
of Indian self-government.").
78. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977) (upholding a federal criminal
prosecution scheme for Native American defendants that differed from state law).
79. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 473, supra note 51, at 8-10; 136 CONG. REc. S17173 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1990) (statements of Senators Akaka, Domenici, and McCain, prior to passage of H.R.
5237).
80. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3010.
81. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988) (establishing as federal crimes
certain named offenses committed by Indians in Indian country); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701,
714-15 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA's delegation of regulatory authority to tribes, which
affected land use by non-Indians outside the reservation).
82. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 555-57 (1975) (upholding congressional
authority to regulate alcoholic beverage distribution activities of a non-Indian business located on
reservation fee land and the delegation of such authority to the tribe); see also Perrin v. United
States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914) (upholding federal prohibition on alcohol sale on reservations
that included reservation fee lands, as well as Congress' "wide discretion" to determine what is
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regulates cultural items that are essential to tribes' internal and social
relations. 3 NAGPRA's jurisdiction appropriately extends over nonIndians and reservation fee lands.
NAGPRA will unquestionably impact perceived or actual property
interests on reservation fee lands. Courts have broadly construed property rights in favor of Native Americans when important Native American interests are at stake. For example, the Supreme Court relied on
the existence of treaty rights to customary fishing sites to find servitudes
and easements on non-Indian fee lands, both on and off the reservation.84 In another case, the Court broadly interpreted a homestead
statute to find that Native Americans rightfully occupied off-reservation
lands, even where they had failed to formally acquire title. 5 Moreover,
Native Americans have, by federal statute, a lesser evidentiary burden
86
during litigation over property rights against non-Indians.
Congress similarly has authority to regulate non-Indian property
rights if cultural items are concerned. Cultural items are arguably
analogous to treaty fishing, hunting, and water rights, as they implicate
interests that lie at the heart of Native American society. 87 Quoting
Chief Oren Lyons of the Onondaga:
Religion, as it has been and is still practiced today on the reservation,
permeates all aspects of tribal society. The language makes no
distinction between religion, government, or law. Tribal customs
and religious ordinances are synonymous. All aspects of life are
tied into one totality. 8
2. State Law
Courts may be asked to apply tribal, federal, or state law by parties
disputing property rights related to cultural items discovered or exca"reasonably essential" to Indians); Nance, 645 F.2d at 714-15 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA's
delegation of regulatory authority to tribes over reservation land pursuant to the Clean Air Act);
United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding application of Mazurie statute).
83. See Senate Hearing,supra note 35, at 54, 56, 181-88, 401-05; Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment,
The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protectionfor Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L.
REv. 705, 732 (1989).
84. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964)
(reserved water rights with priority from date reservation created); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194, 199 (1919) (servitude on off-reservation land to fish); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1905) (easement on private land to fish). See generally COHEN,
supra note 17, at 452.
85. See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1988). Courts have not yet applied this statute to personal property.
The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, however, considered the statute in an earlier bill
establishing the Native American Museum Claims Commission, S. REP. No. 601, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1988).
87. Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 181-182 (testimony of Walter Echo-Hawk).
88. Blair, supra note 47, at 15 (citation omitted).
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vated on reservation fee lands. Regarding state law, the general rule is
that on-reservation Indians and Indian property are not subject to state
law unless Congress expressly indicates otherwise. 9 If non-Indians and
non-Indian reservation fee lands are involved, courts apply preemption
analysis to determine the applicability of state law. 90 Preemption analysis
involves a "particularized inquiry" into the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake to determine whether the exercise of state authority
would be inconsistent with federal law. 9' If the answer is affirmative,
92
courts will look to federal or tribal law.
Neither NAGPRA nor its legislative history indicates that Congress
expressly sanctioned the intrusion of state law on reservation fee lands. 93
Preemption analysis, which weighs tribal, federal, and state interests at
stake, often turns on the degree of "Indianness" of the events.9 Situations
involving compelling Indian interests and comparatively weak state or local
government interests usually weigh in favor of federal preemption. 95

89. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). Federal law,
pursuant to Public Law 280, authorizes the transfer to states of jurisdiction over most crimes and
many civil matters in Indian country. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (West Supp. 1991). Public Law 280,
however, does not subject Indian country to local regulation by states or local governments. See
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Accordingly, federal law does not provide
states with independent regulatory jurisdiction over the control and disposition of cultural items
in Indian country.
90. See supra note 89.
91. Id; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (holding
that federal law preempted state motor carrier license and use fuel taxes); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-92 (1965) (holding that federal Indian
trader statutes preempted state tax). A related inquiry is whether application of state law would
unlawfully infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them. See Williams v. Lee, 439 U.S. 463, 502 (1979).
92. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 270-79.
93. The House Committee contemplated a limited application of state law in defining "right
of possession," which applies only to disputes between museums and Native Americans. See H.R.
REP. No. 877, supra note 5, at 15, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4374. It rejected a definition
of "right of possession" that preserved the "application of relevant State law." Id. at 2, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4378. The House Committee also rejected a bill prohibiting excavations
from burial sites without a state permit. Id. at 11, 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4370,
4383.
94. See Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States
Policies Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REv. 643, 665-66 (1991).
95. See id.; Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (holding
that federal law preempted New Mexico tax on contractor constructing tribal school on tribal
lands with BIA and tribal money); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding that federal law did not preempt Washington sales tax on cigarettes
purchased by nonmembers and that the state interest is stronger if the subject revenues are not
derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the tribe); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that federal law preempted Arizona
income tax on tribal member residing on Navajo reservation).
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Native American individuals and tribes have a keen interest in activities pertaining to cultural items.9 Tribes and tribal members hold
special reverence for religious, cultural, and funerary objects, and
usually created the. objects themselves.Y Cultural patrimony and sacred
objects are integral in defining Native American religious and cultural
societies . Giving persons other than descendants control over their
ancestors' remains and associated funerary objects is considered sacrilegious and offensive by most Native Americans." Native Americans
assert that not only does lack of control over these items interfere with
their ability to maintain traditions and ceremonial obligations, it is a
bitter reminder of past discrimination and injustices.' °°
The Federal Government's interest in vesting ownership, control, and
authority to protect all items excavated from Indian country with Native
Americans is best reflected in its trust responsibility toward Native
Americans.' 0 ' The trust responsibility, which arises through federal
legislation and the special relationship between the Government and
Native Americans, forms a basis for protecting tribal cultures and
religions.' 0 2 The Government may also wish to avoid a checkerboard
jurisdictional scheme over the control and disposition of cultural items
on Indian reservations. 01 3
Most, if not all states, have yet to enact laws ensuring Native Americans
power over the ultimate disposition of cultural items other than human
remains and funerary objects."l 4 States may assert interests in cultural items
relating to conservation, preservation, protection, and education.1l° Nonetheless, state interests are less forceful if state statutes allow private individuals to own excavated items.'0

See Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 181-88, 401-05; Ezra, supra note 83, at 732.
See Blair, supra note 47, at 16.
Id.
See David J. Harris, Comment, Respect of the Living and Respect for the Dead: Return
of Indian and Other Native American Burial Remains, 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195,
198 (1991).
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

See REPORT OF THE PANEL FOR A NATIONAL DIALoouE ON MUSEUM/NATIVE AMERICAN

RELATIONS 3 (Feb. 28, 1990) (reprinted in appendix).

101. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 220-28.
102. See Ezra, supra note 83, at 728-29.
103. This policy is not documented in NAGPRA's legislative history.
104. See generally H. MARCUS PRICE, III, DISPUTING THE DEAD: U.S. LAW ON ABORIGINAL
RE A Ns AND GRAVE GOODS (1991).
105. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 27.53.010 (1989). Many states have enacted statutes
pertaining to aboriginal remains, unmarked graves, grave goods, and cultural and religious items.
Some state laws apply to private lands or generally to lands within the state.
106. To illustrate, Washington's statute extends to excavation activities on public and private
lands. See id. § 27.53.060. Covered items include archaeological resources located on land or
water under state or local government control. Id. § 27.53.040. Excavation on private lands
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The pattern of federal legislation concerning Native American human
remains and cultural items indicates Congress' intent to occupy the

field. 0 7 The Antiquities Act of 1906 prohibits most physical disturbances

of archaeological objects on lands owned or controlled by the federal

government, which include Indian lands. 08 The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 encourages Native American participation in
decisions and makes federal money available for cultural heritage preservation. 109

ARPA establishes mechanisms to protect archaeological resources on
public or Indian lands and largely supersedes the Antiquities Act." 0
ARPA recognizes Native American control over the ultimate disposition

of archaeological resources found on Indian lands."' It also requires,
as a precondition to permit issuance, consent of the tribe or Native
American individual with jurisdiction or ownership over the subject
Indian lands." 2
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("AIRFA")" 3 supplements First Amendment protection of Indian religious rights." 4 AIRFA
protects access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the
freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites." ' AIRFA
directs federal agencies to evaluate and modify their policies to protect
Native American religious cultural rights and practices." 6
3. Tribal Law
Accordingly, our non-Native American landowner is told that the
controlling law is NAGPRA. The attorney encourages his client to

requires a state permit and permission of the landowner. Id. § 27.53.060(2). The statute has no
repatriation provisions, but provides for reinterment of Native American human remains. See id.
§ 27.44 (1989). The finder can keep the archaeological resource as long as he allows the state to
access the object and the landowner is not interested in ownership. See WAsH. ADMIN. CODE §
25-48-090 (1989).
107. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 69092 (1965) (holding that federal Indian trader statutes preempted state tax). See generally COHEN,
supra note 17, at 276-77.
108. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433; see United States v. Diaz, 368 F. Supp. 856 (D. Ariz. 1973)
(implicitly holding that Indian reservation land is within the Antiquities Act jurisdiction). The
Ninth Circuit held that portions of the statute were unconstitutional. United States v. Diaz, 499
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w6.
110. Id. § 470aa-mm (1988 & West Supp. 1991). As noted, however, ARPA's jurisdiction
extends only to trust lands.
111. Id. § 470dd.
112. Id. § 470cc(g).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
114. See Bowman, supra note 36, at 190-92.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
116. Id.
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negotiate with the tribe if he is unhappy with the plan to control and
protect the items. He tells his client that another avenue is to challenge
the tribe's interpretation of NAGPRA by filing a lawsuit in inverse
condemnation against the Federal Government." 7 The attorney informs
his client that the federal court could look to tribal law to define
property rights.
The primary sources of tribal law are treaties and retained sovereignty
as implemented through tribal constitutions, legal codes, and common
law." 8 Most treaties lack express provisions relating to ownership of
cultural items or religious and cultural practices. 19 Tribes have retained
20
sovereignty necessary to protect tribal control over internal relations.
Tribes also retain inherent sovereign power to regulate conduct by nonIndians and conduct on reservation fee lands that threatens or has some
direct effect on the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or
2
health or welfare.1 '
Tribal laws and customs pertaining to the control and ownership of
cultural items found on tribal lands would, in most cases, be valid
exercises of tribal authority. Conduct affecting the items would likely
impact the tribe's internal relations, which are closely tied to customs
and spiritual beliefs. 122 Tribal authority to regulate the control and
disposition of cultural items is arguably analogous to other well-established areas of tribal inherent authority, such as determining tribal
membership, regulating domestic relations, and establishing inheritance

rules. 123
Courts have held that tribal law controls the existence and nature of
certain property rights. For example, in Colville Confederated Tribes
117. See, e.g., Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (claiming that the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe's redesignation of reservation air quality, accomplished through federally delegated
authority, constituted a Fifth Amendment taking).
118. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559, 564-65 (1981). In contrast, tribes may lack
jurisdiction to regulate cultural items found outside the reservation. See Vicki Quade, Who Owns
the Past?: Interview with Walter Echo-Hawk, 16 HuM. RTs. Q., Winter 1989, at 24 (1989-1990).
119. See Quade, supra note 118, at 69. However, implied treaty rights might provide a basis
for federal and tribal law. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (implied treaty
rights to reserved water). See generally COHEN, supra note 17, at 222. Tribes might have understood
at the time they signed the treaties that they retained ownership of cultural items found on the
reservation.
120. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564; see also Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
425 (1989).
121. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565; see also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 426 (recognizing the continued
applicability of Montana.)
122. See supra note 98. Many tribes have laws in place pertaining to laying the dead to rest,
but few, if any, have statutes addressing handling and disposing of excavated remains. See Quade,
supra note 118, at 27.
123. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
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v. Walton, 2 4 the Ninth Circuit found that the tribe, not the state, had
regulatory authority over water rights held by a non-Indian allottee on
the reservation. Weighing in the tribe's favor was the location of the
watershed entirely within the reservation and the fact that tribal control
would have no impact on state water rights outside the reservation. 2
By analogy, tribal law should control property rights to cultural items
found on the reservation, as well as property rights affected by required
protective measures. Tribal regulation in such instances would have
little to no effect on off-reservation property rights defined by state
law. Moreover, courts would likely find that tribal or individual Native
American interests in controlling and protecting the items outweighed
state interests in public education and protection.
Many tribes have not yet adopted laws regulating the disposition,
control, and protection of cultural items. 26 In the absence of tribal
law, courts searching for applicable law may look to federal common
law to define parties' property rights.' 27 Neither NAGPRA nor its
legislative history demonstrates Congress' intent to preempt federal
common-law remedies.'u
NAGPRA is. a valid exercise of Congress' plenary authority. Tribal
law and federal common law provide supplemental authority if NAGPRA
is ambiguous or fails to address property rights. State law is probably
preempted by federal law on tribal lands, particularly in light of strong
federal and tribal interests at stake.
B. Has A Taking Occurred?
The tribe decides that the objects are cultural items and sends the
landowner a letter outlining a plan for control and protection. The
124. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
125. Id. at 52-53. The court also noted that deference to state water law would create
jurisdictional confusion that Congress sought to avoid. Id. at 53; cf. United States v. Anderson,
736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit in Anderson held that the state, not the tribe,
had regulatory authority over a non-Indian's on-reservation water rights. The court distinguished
the Walton holding based on the watershed's extension well beyond reservation boundaries and
the more significant state interest. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366.
126. See Quade, supra note 118, at 27.
127. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985) (federal
common law provided the Tribe with a right to sue to enforce its aboriginal land rights in the
absence of direct statutory authority); National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985) (federal common law provided the insurance company with a federal
cause of action against allegedly unlawful tribal court power); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982) (action challenging tribe's authority to regulate a non-Indian business
arose under federal common law). See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HA.v. L. REv. 881 (1986). Ms. Field notes that courts addressing
Indian law matters frequently omit discussion of federal common-lawmaking authority because it
is "so thoroughly accepted and well established." Id. at 948.
128. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 238.
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plan calls for leaving the items in the ground, protected by fenced-in
areas with thirty-foot buffer zones. The tribe requests that the landowner cease logging or any other surface or subsurface activities within
the fenced-in areas. The landowner's attempts to negotiate a less onerous
plan fail, and he decides to file a suit in inverse condemnation against
the United States.
Other scenarios could likewise unfold. For example, the tribe or an
individual Native American might seek unrestricted access to the burial
mounds or desire the object excavated. Assuming that NAGPRA amends
ARPA by implication 2 9 or that the tribal code requires a permit to
excavate cultural items on reservation fee lands, the tribe, Native
American individual, or landowner might obtain a permit to excavate
the item. The tribe might then wish to display the items on-site and
allow non-members (for a fee) and members access to view them. In
an extreme case, the tribe might try to exclude the landowner because
the burial site covers his entire parcel.
The Fifth Amendment 30 conditions the exercise of governmental
power by prohibiting takings of property for public use without just
compensation.' Landowners and others adversely affected by governmental activity can bring actions in inverse condemnation and demand
that the government initiate formal condemnation proceedings.'
In
any of the scenarios described above, the landowner might seek compensation for returning his excavated land to useable condition, for
demolition, or for other costs associated with removing a structure built
over the excavation site, or for diminished value of his land due to the
required protective measures.
Governmental action that fails to substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land
effectuates a taking. " Although courts accept a certain amount of
regulation of private property, they find a taking if a regulation "goes
too far." 14 The Supreme Court applies a two-prong alternative test to
determine if a taking has resulted. The first prong, also known as the
public purpose test, inquires into the relationship between the govern-

129. See supra note 31.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
131. See First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
132. Id. (acknowledging the right to bring an action in inverse condemnation due to the "self
executing character" of the Fifth Amendment); see also JACQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER,
THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 37 (1982).
133. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (citing Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
134. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922).
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mental action and its purpose. '35 Courts find takings if the governmental
action is not intended for a public purpose, but usually defer to
congressional determinations of public use. 136
The second prong of the analysis evaluates the economic impact of
the governmental action and the extent to which it interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 3 7 Courts engage in factual
inquiries related to the difference between the value of the property
taken and that remaining, the surviving uses, and the value of property
at various points in time.' A court is more likely to find a taking if
the government's interference with the property divests the owner of a
"stick in the bundle of property rights,"' 31 9 denies him all economically
viable use of his land, or can be characterized as a physical invasion.'1 °
NAGPRA's legislative history provides some guidance to courts analyzing takings claims regarding the adverse impacts of required protective measures, as opposed to property interests in the item itself.
NAGPRA requires an inadvertent discoverer to make a "reasonable
effort" to protect the item before resuming activity.' 4' The Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs intended that the notification process
would allow tribes or Native American individuals to intervene in

135. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61.
136. See GELIN & MILLER, supra note 132, at 6, 14. Although probably not fatal, NAGPRA
contains no findings that explain how the transfer of protected objects from private parties to
Native Americans advances the public good. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 51, at 22. Courts have
found public use in a wide variety of circumstances, including condemned property that was
transferred to private beneficiaries. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44
(1944) (upholding the state's condemnation and sale of large landholdings to decentralize land
ownership patterns); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (upholding the city's condemnation of land in a residential neighborhood to construct a
General Motors plant).
Even without findings, courts would undoubtedly find that the purposes of NAGPRA constitute
"public use." The Act does not represent Congress' authorization of transfer of property for the
benefit of private parties. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)) (stating that tribes are not private entities).
137. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
138. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-37; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).
139. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 (federal legislation altering Indian escheat provisions for trust
and restricted lands); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (imposition of a federal
navigable servitude requiring public access to a pond).
140. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124.
141. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3002(d)(1). NAGPRA does not indicate, however, whether or the extent
to which the tribe may permanently preclude the activity in certain areas. Nor does it expressly
acknowledge Native American involvement with the disposition and control of items left in the
ground, as opposed to those excavated or removed.
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development activities on tribal lands to safeguard the objects and
determine their appropriate disposition. The Committee expected, however, that such intervention would not "bar," "significantly interrupt,"
or "impair" development on tribal lands. 142
Courts will find little direct precedent for takings claims arising from
archaeological site protective measures. 143 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals addressed the issue in Thompson v. City of Red Wing.' 44 The
case involved the Thompsons' plans to extract gravel from a portion
of their seventy-three-acre parcel, which were thwarted by the city's
refusal to-grant either a rezone or conditional use permit and the state's
45
application of its statute protecting burial grounds.
The Thompsons' parcel consisted of mostly rolling hills and a peninsula-shaped bluff surrounded on three sides by a wooded ravine.'
The Thompsons had continually farmed and grazed animals on nearly
all of their land, including the top of the bluff. This bluff contained
a "large, unique" Indian burial mound formation with burial mounds
scattered over four to five acres and was the envisioned gravel extraction

site. 147
The Thompsons sued the city and state, eventually settling with the
city. 48 The remaining issue at trial was whether Minnesota's statute
protecting human burials effectuated an inverse condemnation against
the property. 49 The court found for the Thompsons and ordered the
state to pay attorney's fees; the state appealed. 150
Despite the court's holding that the Thompsons' claim was not ripe
for adjudication,'' the court considered de novo the legal question of
whether a taking had occurred. The court held that the Thompsons
had failed to demonstrate that application of the statute deprived them

142. See SEN. REP. No. 473, supra note 51, at 10; 136 CONG. REc. S17173, 17176 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1990) (discussion between Senators Simpson and McCain).
143. See People v. Van Horn, 267 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Ct. App. 1990). A professional archaeologist
unsuccessfully challenged California's Native American artifact protection statute on Fifth Amendment grounds, alleging that the law deprived him of his right to practice his profession. Id.
144. 455 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
145. Id. at 514-15.
146. Id. at 514.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 515.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. The state had not issued a final decision regarding the statute's application to the parcel.
Id. at 515-16. Accordingly, the court could not determine the extent to which the statute interfered
with the Thompsons' economic expectations. Id.
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of all reasonable uses of their land. The state had not sought to curtail
farming and grazing activities atop the burial mounds. 5 2 Further, the
court was unconvinced that the Thompsons' property benefitted a
planned city enterprise in the form of a park." 3 The court concluded:
Not every regulation challenged as effecting a taking can give rise
to an action for inverse condemnation. Only where the taking or
damage is irreversible will such an action lie. The Thompsons have
failed to demonstrate an enterprise function for which the substantial
diminution in market value standard is applicable, and have failed
to establish that the statute deprived them of any reasonable use of
that portion of their land. As a matter of law, the requisite elements
of a compensable taking are absent here." 4
Courts wrestling with the appropriate reach of tribal protective measures will apply the Supreme Court's two-prong takings analysis. The
required measure must first substantially advance tribal or individual
control or protection over the cultural item.' Courts are more likely
to view askance tribal or individual attempts to monetarily profit from
the item solely at the expense of the landowner. 5 6 Such profit motives
might arguably fall outside of Congress' purpose in enacting NAGPRA.
Courts following the second prong of the analysis may require
compensation if the tribe or individual Native American attempts to
completely exclude the landowner from his property or requires demolition of an existing structure.'5 7 Compensation would similarly be
required if the tribe or individual sought permanent access to the items
without acquiring an easement.'
On the other hand, tribes and individuals may seek reasonable
measures related to protection or control that fall short of denying
landowners all economically viable uses of their land. 5 9 Permissible

152. Id. at 517.
153. Id. The enterprise theory involves regulation for the sole benefit of a governmental
enterprise, such as a municipal airport, which disproportionately burdens only a few individuals.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978). In these cases, the
government should pay for what is essentially an easement, as opposed to a permissible arbitration
between competing land uses. See Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990).
154. Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
158. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (governmental
requirement of an easement deprives the landowner of the essential right to exclude others and
constitutes a permanent physical occupation of the property).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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protective requirements probably would include allowing certain continued surface uses or precluding activity on only portions of the property.
These measures would allow the landowner to still reap some profit
from the land. 6°
If the focus of the takings claim is the cultural item, as opposed to
the protective measures imposed on the land, courts defining property
rights will probably consider legal and equitable principles relevant to
the particular item. Landowners or finders of human remains or associated, and probably unassociated, funerary objects will rarely have
vested property interests in the items. Courts may find that a tribe's
communal property interest in cultural patrimony, and often in sacred
objects, weighs against private ownership. Courts will also consider
equitable principles related to these items, not the least of which is the
importance to Native American societies. Courts following the Charrier
reasoning may also inquire into the tribe's or Native American ancestor's original intent to abandon the objects.
V.

CONCLUSION

By enacting NAGPRA, Congress took a significant step toward
redressing past errors and granting Native Americans control over the
ultimate fate of cultural items. The law stresses the importance of the
items' cultural and religious values, as opposed to monetary value.
NAGPRA encourages dialogue between federal agencies, museums,
tribes, and individual Native Americans. It also confirms the authority
of tribes and individual Native Americans over items discovered or
excavated on federal and tribal lands, while not interfering with the
operation of state law on off-reservation, non-federal lands.
In few instances will parties raise tenable Fifth Amendment takings
claims under NAGPRA. The Act anticipates such claims in the context
of the museum and federal agency repatriation process and defers to
applicable law once takings claims are implicated. Rarely will parties
discovering human remains or funerary objects on tribal lands hold
vested property rights. Although the legal status of sacred objects and
cultural patrimony is less firmly established, Native Americans have at
the very least strong equitable arguments favoring ownership.
Most initial activity undertaken pursuant to NAGPRA probably will
focus on the museum and federal agency repatriation process. The
Department of Interior ("DOI"), however, should also develop rules
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addressing the fate of cultural items discovered or excavated on tribal
lands. The parties most likely to seek judicial review of matters left
unaddressed by Congress include landowners or finders of cultural
items on reservation fee lands.
DOI rules should continue the cooperative spirit evidenced in NAGPRA and its legislative history. The rules should create an orderly
process and applicable burdens of proof for establishing existence of a
cultural item as well as cultural affiliation (when items are discovered).
Such rules should avoid excessive delay in the landowner's ability to
resume activity and thereby lessen the likelihood of takings claims.
NAGPRA's Review Committee can play an integral role in the process.
The rules should provide an administrative forum for parties to
attempt to negotiate grievances. The DOI could also establish guidelines
to assist tribes and individual Native Americans to develop reasonable
measures for the protection and disposition of cultural items. The
agency should also decide whether NAGPRA implicitly amends ARPA's
jurisdiction over covered items and lands. Depending upon the decision,
the agency should amend its regulations or encourage Congress to
amend either or both of the statutes.
Situations that cannot be resolved through negotiations will end up
in court. Courts should analyze takings claims on tribal lands by first
considering NAGPRA and its legislative history, and then looking to
tribal or federal common law. Tribal governments are advised to
expeditiously enact laws addressing protection and control of cultural
items found on the reservation.

